The emergence of human rights as a public concern during the Carter administration was a recrudescence of the long tradition of moralism in Ameri can foreign policy. Confident that the republic is the pinnacle of political, social, and human development, Americans have believed since 1776 that the "United States must be a beacon o f human rights to an unregenerate world" (Schlesinger, 1978: 505). Yet, while to the founding fathers America's avoidance of Europe's evils of class, hierarchy, and power politics was to be its greatest glory it is quite clear that they intended the U.S. to illuminate the path to a better world by example not by action. John Quincy Adam's famous July 4 speech explained his perception of America's mission to the world:
human rights' policy that went beyond mere pious pronouncements about human dignity or a focus on the abuses o f Communist bloc states to a more rigorous posture that at times took into account the human rights* record of a regime when determining the level of real U.S. support (Schoultz, 1981 : Collins, 1981 Schlesinger, 1978; Fascell, 1978; Robertson, 1979) . In fact, conservative Re publicans, as noted by Bundy (1979) , took Carter's human rights record to task complaining it hurt our "friends" in Iran and Nicaragua and was overly selective in targeting only "friendly" states such as Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Argentina (Buckley, 1980) . On the other hand, authors such as Hoffman (1977-78: 19-20) criticized Carter's human rights record in that it was not much different from practices in earlier administrations. As Kegley and Wittkopf (1982: 556-7) explain, "Carter stressed example over action and rhetorical ideals over coer cion" thus his "human rights record was less distinguished than its rhetoric." While Carter "associated human rights with a posture o f moral concern" and advanced "mild institutional initiatives at the U .N." (Falk, 1980:220) , any strong policy mandating sanctions against regimes supported by the U.S. and poor human rights records were scuttled by geopolitical concerns or significant domestic economic interests (Larzeg, 1979; Early, 1978; Salzberg, 1981; Tonelson, 1982-83) .
While there appears to be some question whether Carter engaged in an activist moralism or not there seems to be little disagreement concerning the Reagan administration's attitude towards human rights. Reagan, perceiving the U.S. to be "infinitely virtuous" and a "divinely annoited land," is a messianic crusader like Dulles who believes the U.S. must protect the weak from the evil in the modem world (Schlesinger, 1983:5) . As a result, Reagan's first term "bore an almost eerie similarity to the years 1949 to 1954, (Bell, 1984: 494) ," leading scholars to conclude that Reagan permitted security issues to dominate moral imperatives and that "violations of human rights in other countries are not a significant concern of the United States (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1982: 556) ." Convinced that communist totalitarianism is less susceptible, if at all, to demo cratic forces than right wing autocracies the Reagan administration argued, expressed in articles by former U.N. ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and Ernest Lefever (the early Reagan choice to head the State Department's human rights bureau), that support for third world authoritarians friendly to the U.S. will permit these states to evolve democratically toward the American exampleswhich they could not do if subverted by Soviet sponsored revolutionaries (Tonelson, 1982-83: 56-57) .
To summarize, there are two interrelated dimensions that impact on U.S. human rights policy, namely moralism and internationalism. And while it is easy to place some actors in the appropriate cells (see matrix below) the issue of where Carter and Reagan fit is of considerable interest and the focus of this paper. Obviously, the 19th century, exemplified by Adams' speech is a good example of a period where the U.S. did little more than assume a posture of moral superiority confident that reasons and the force of its example would be sufficient to have the world to follow its lead. Cell B is best identified with Wilson s failed idealism/legalism where moral admonishments were rendered ineffective by the unwillingness of the U.S. to actively promote those values inherent to Wilson's vision. Cell C reflects the bulk of the WWII era, including perhaps the Reagan administration, where a "philanthropic" America provides the security requisite for the "free world" to develop democratic and free-enterprise based societies free from Soviet inspired subversion. Finally, Cell D is characterized by an America actively using its leverage to intercede on the behalf of the oppressed citizenry of the world -or if not the world then within its client states. Presumably, the Carter administration is located in cell D. This paper is thus directed at ascertaining whether or not Carter met the policy obligations posed by his rhetoric and whether Reagan's human rights record is significantly different from his predecessor. More specifically, I am concerned with whether there are statistically significant differences in levels of U.S. support for regimes with good/poor human rights' records between the Carter and Reagan administrations and whether or not the charges that Carter punished U.S. "allies" and Reagan supports authoritarian but not totalitarian regimes are in fact correct. For, if Carter did indeed bring to foreign policy a commitment to human rights considerably different from his predecessors it must be asked whether such a policy direction continued into the Reagan administration. Certainly, Reagan talks about human rights, has not disbanded the State Department's human rights' bureau, and even proclaimed in 1984 a "human rights' day [December 10] and week. Yet, the conventional wisdom is that Reagan has turned his back on the Carter formulation and has either sought, for ideological reasons, to "emasculate" human rights' policy (Maechling, 1983: 120) or has engaged in policies that have not been effective, in terminating human rights abuses particularly by the right wing governments friendly to the U.S., (Tonelson, 1982-83) . Simply put the issue is if Reagan is different than Carter how have the differences been expressed in his human rights policies.
Carter Versus Reagan: Civil Rights Records

Human Rights: Conceptualization and Operationalization
The rich and varied literature on human rights is replete with definitional and measurement questions (Pollis and Schwab, 1979; Dominguez, 1979; Said, 1978; McCamant, 1981) . Most early authors usually noted three schools of thought on human rights and identified them eventually as Western, Soviet, or Third World. Yet, in the most recent literature there has been less attention paid to the Soviet model as its primarily economic welfare and equity focus seems to have been merged into both the First World and Third World conceptualizations; while, a new formulation based on "world order" schemes that avowedly eschew the statist bias of previous views in favor of a radical reformation of existing international social political and economic systems has claimed a number of human rights adherents (Falk, 1980; Mazuri, 1978; Fields, 1978; Said, 1978 Is the Reagan administration antithetical to the idea of human rig being used as a criteria in determining aid to foreign countries? Or does his administration employ a distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian re gimes when fixing levels of U.S. aid?
Results
The statistics displayed below are indicative of an ambivalent relationship between human rights measures and an administration's foreign aid policy. Table 1 shows, for example, that in a global sample of 92 states (see Chart 2) neither the Carter nor Reagan administrations distinguished among human rights records when distributing U.S. foreign aid. It must be concluded, therefore, that for question one the answer is a resounding "no", and that there was no coherent global human rights posture advanced by either administration.
While the answer to question one is a definite "no", the answer to the issue o f whether an "operational code" determining U.S. foreign policy elites' defini tion o f human rights exists or not is a mixed one. It is apparent from the ANOVA statistics in Tables 2 and 3 and the questionable results in Table 1 between GASPOL and change in economic and military aid that the western version of human rights tends to support and define U.S. policy. Of the 8 significant Fstatistics in Table 2 and the 11 found in Table 3 , 5 (63%) and 6 (55%) respectively involve either a derivation o f one or more o f Gastil's measures of human rights. Surprisingly, however, is the strength of the economic measures o f human rights in determining U.S. aid levels, especially during the Carter administration. So while it is possible to say that a western perception underlies U.S. aid it is also accurate to note that the U.S. also exhibits some concern for the idea o f "economic liberty" found in the third world definition of human rights.
Of course, the issue o f whether or not Carter used American aid to reward or punish recipients predicated, in part, on their human rights records is still open to question. In the global sample (Table 1) there is no correlation between the Carter administration's aid and a regime's human rights history. However, Table  3 supports the idea that Carter did consider human rights records when giving assistance, especially military aid, to "friendly states." This indicates that Carter did indeed treat nations with which the U.S. had both economic and military ties differendy than the rest of the world. In sum, while there is an association between some human rights measures and U.S. aid to "friendly states" it is clear that Carter did not have a global policy and as such was not any different than the succeeding administration. In fact, no matter which definition is used the interaction effects of President and human rights (Table 2) are never significant.
Finally, taking Tables 2 and 4 together it is possible to say that not only has the Reagan administration no coherent global human rights policy, and/or that it does not even utilize the distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes advanced by its apologists when granting either economic or military aid. The ANOVA and eta2 statistics demonstrate no significant relationship between regime character and U.S. aid in either the total or "friendly" state samples. Moreover, given the almost uniformly lower F and eta2 statistics in the "friendly" sample it is possible to observe that the Reagan administration seems less concerned with its allies' human rights records than other nations.
Conclusion
If anything startling emerges from this study it is the association between human rights records and U.S. aid to "friendly states" particularly military assistance, in the Carter administration. This finding should confound those who believe Carter's record was nothing more than rhetorical flourishes with little if any intervention to promote human rights among recipients of U.S. aid. The fact, Carter focused more on those countries with which the U.S. had some leverage rather than a global policy reflects both a hard-headed realism and an awareness of the limited capacity, given the availability of foreign aid funding, to engage in a worldwide human rights crusade. The concentration on "friendly states," 14 of 16 being either authoritarian or totalitarian based on Gastil's measures, also lends credence to those who argued that Carter was more concerned with the "sins" of our friends and less with the transgressions of other states (Abrams, 1983-84: 174) . Whether this was an unfortunate fact or realistic politics, it is obvious that the congruence between Carter's moral activism and intervention on behalf of human rights creates a powerful legacy that evidently has not been fully appreciated by the scholarly community.
On the other hand, the Reagan administration apparently pays little atten tion in determining aid levels to the human rights records o f U.S. aid recipients. In fact, as Table 4 Totalitarian is when SPOL=3 and SCIV=3, SPOL =3, and SCIV=2, and SPOL=2 and SCIV=3 Authoritarian is when SPOL=2 and SCIV=2.
